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Jefferson Parish and Its Progeny:
More Efficient Health Care at What
Price? *
H. WARD CLASSEN**
INTRODUCTION
In response to rising costs and increasing numbers of medical
malpractice suits, many hospitals have contracted with inde-
pendent physician groups for provision of health care services.'
These physician groups act as independent contractors, thereby
lowering the risk of malpractice recoveries against the hospital.
2
* Copyright 1987 by H. Ward Classen.
** B.A. Trinity College 1982; J.D. Catholic University 1985. The author would
like to express his gratitude to Jeffrey T. Agnor, Esquire, Matthew S. Greenberg, Esquire
and Christina L. Smith for their help in preparing this Article.
I These contractual arrangements allow the hospital to reduce its malpractice
liability by designating the contracting physicians as independent contractors. When
sued, a hospital can use the contract as evidence that it did not exercise control over
the physician and that it intended the physician to be an independent contractor, thereby
exculpating the hospital from liability. See infra note 2.
For an in-depth discussion of the use of the independent contractor exception by
health care providers, see generally Lisko, Hospital Liability Under Theories of Respond-
ent Superior and Corporate Negligence, 47 UMKC L. Rv. 171 (1978); Southwick, The
Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLay. MAR. L. REv. 147 (1968).
2 A typical contract between a physician group and a hospital would contain the
following language:
3. STATUS OF CLASSEN SURGICAL GROUP
3.1 Existing Staff. The Hospital acknowledges that the surgeons pres-
ently employed by Classen, as identified on Schedule I attached to this
Agreement, are fully privileged to practice cardiovascular surgery at the
Hospital and that the nursing and other paramedical personnel em-
ployed by Classen and comprising the Classen Group are authorized to
participate in surgical procedures at the Hospital under the direction of
Classen or the surgeons employed by him.
3.2 Staff Privileges. The Hospital recognizes that Classen's expertise in
the field of cardiac surgery qualifies him to select and evaluate surgeons
for employment as part of the Classen Group and the practice of cardiac
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These contractual relationships also allow hospitals to provide
more cost-efficient services, lowering the overall expense of health
care.3 In return for staffing a specific hospital department, the
physician group usually receives the exclusive right to provide a
particular service, such as anesthesiology, laboratory, or emer-
gency services to the hospital's patients. 4 These exclusive con-
surgery at the Hospital. Accordingly, upon request by Classen from
time to time, the Hospital will grant full surgical privileges to surgeons
employed by Classen as part of the Classen Group. Staff privileges for
each surgeon presently employed by Classen and for each surgeon
employed by Classen in the future will be granted, extended or renewed
by the Hospital expressly subject to the condition that the privileges
for cardiac surgery shall remain in effect only so long as the surgeon
is employed as part of the Classen Group and shall terminate upon
termination of such employment.
3.3 Independent Contractor Status. Classen and its employees compris-
ing the Classen Group will perform surgical services at the Hospital as
provided by this Agreement for the account of Classen and not as
employees or agents of the Hospital. Classen shall have the exclusive
right to select, retain, terminate, supervise and provide for the remu-
neration of the employed surgeons and paramedical personnel consti-
tuting the Classen Group. Classen and his employees shall act in the
capacity of independent contractors (for which purpose the terms of
the consultating service arrangement shall be such that Classen and his
employees shall be considered independent contractors under the appli-
cable Social Security laws).
Health care costs of the hospital or health care provider can be reduced in
several ways. First, administrative costs are significantly reduced. The physician group
normally will be responsible for hilling the patients, hiring its own staff, maintaining
any necessary equipment and managing all other aspects of providing its particular
services. Additionally, the physicians will provide their own malpractice insurance.
Second, under many agreements the physician group assumes the risk that the par-
ticular service will be underutilized. The physician group will benefit, however, if the par-
ticular service is overutilized. For example, if too few patients utilize the hospital's emergency
room, the physician group will lose money because the emergency room was overstaffed.
If the emergency room is extremely busy, however, the physician group will make an even
greater amount of money.
A typical contract includes the following language:
1. GRANT OF EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES BY HOSPITAL. The Hospital
grants to Classen the exclusive right to perform all vascular surgery and to
use heart-lung machines for patients in the Hospital during the term of this
Agreement.
2. OBLIGATIONS OF CLASSEN. Classen, individually, and with the
services of the Classen Group, agrees to provide all vascular surgery services
required by patients in the Hospital.
I Because they are "self-contained" specialties, these areas usually are compatible
with closed staffing. Unlike a surgery department which might require 40 surgeons to
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tracts, however, have come under attack as violating the antitrust
laws, specifically those prohibiting "tying arrangements. ' 5
The Supreme Court recently addressed these contentions in
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.6 The Court
held that an exclusive contract providing for a physician group
to render all medical services required by a health care provider7
o
offer a full range of surgical services, a small number of physicians can provide
comprehensive services in these areas.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes every contract, combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade illegal. It provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing
contained in sections I to 7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or
agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity
which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark,
brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and
which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general
class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of
that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any
statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be made,
the making of such contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method
of competition under section 45 of this title: Provided further, That the
preceding provision shall not make lawful any contract or agreement,
providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices
on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between
producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors,
or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in com-
petition with each other. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of
this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1. (1986).
A tying arrangement "ties" two products together so that they may not be
purchased separately. Spartan Grain and Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419 (5th Cir.
1978). For an in-depth discussion of tying arrangements, see REPORT OF THm ATroRNY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL CONMMSSION TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWs 145 (1955); Craswell,
Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.L.
REv. 661, 666-68 (1982); Slawson, A Stronger, Simpler, Tie-In Doctrine, 25 ANTITRUST
BuLL. 671, 676-84 (1980); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements under the Anti-
trust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50, 60-62 (1958).
466 U.S. 2 (1984).
The term "health care provider" refers to any individual or entity that provides
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does not, in and of itself, violate federal antitrust laws.8 This
decision broke new ground by acknowledging the legality of
these increasingly utilized physician-hospital contracts9 and by
possibly signaling the end of per sel0 scrutiny in tying arrange-
ments." Since the Jefferson Parish decision, several important
lower court decisions have expanded its reasoning,12 creating new
interpretations which are potentially incompatible with previous
rulings.' 3 These rulings threaten to create a new niche in antitrust
law for health care providers.'
4
This Article briefly examines the development of case law in
"tying arrangements." It then explores the Jefferson Parish
decision, examining both the majority opinion and the O'Connor
concurrence. These opinions represent a potential dichotomy
among the justices in the proper approach to determine the
legality of health care tying arrangements. The Article concludes
with a review of subsequent health care antitrust decisions and
a discussion of the impact of those decisions.
I. HISTORIC SURVEY OF THE Per Se APPROACH TO TYING
ARRANGEMENTS
A. International Salt: Per Se Illegality
The United States Supreme Court has long reserved the right
to hold certain types of contractual arrangements unreasonable
and unlawful.' 5 A specific arrangement's character, in and of
health care services including physicians, hospitals, and nursing homes, as well as
alternative delivery systems such as Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") and
Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs").
8 466 U.S. at 32.
9 See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
10 Under per se scrutiny, courts need not investigate an activity's reasonableness
to determine if it violates the antitrust laws. Connecticut Ass'n of Clinical Laboratories
v. Connecticut Blue Cross Inc., 324 A.2d 288, 299 (Conn. 1973). See also infra note 28
and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 125-42, 148-61 and accompanying text.
"1 Compare text accompanying notes 123-61 infra with text accompanying notes
15-58 infra.
14 See infra notes 163-91 and accompanying text.
'1 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948) (contracts
involving price-fixng, refusal to deal with non-members of an association, or licensing
of a patented device on condition unpatented materials be used held per se illegal).
[Vol. 75
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itself, may be a sufficient ground for determining such a contract
to be illegal, without any analysis of the contract's effect on the
market. 16 In essence, because such arrangements present a severe
risk of suppressing competition, they are per se unlawful. 17 Price-
fi'ing arrangements's and tying arrangements are two such agree-
ments. In tying arrangements, customers are required to pur-
chase an additional product (the tied product) 9 whenever they
buy the tying product. These arrangements are held unlawful
because they restrict customers' ability to freely choose their
purchases. 20
I( See, e.g., Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50
(1977) (certain agreements or practices have such a pernicious effect on commerce and
lack any redeeming virtue that they are conclusively presumed illegal).
See 334 U.S. at 522-23.
Price fixing is the cooperative agreement by competitors regarding prices to be
charged to customers. Such behavior is prohibited under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1 (1986). Price fixing can be either vertical (attempting to control resale prices) or
horizontal (agreements among competitors). Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n.,
326 F. Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
"I Sales of the tied product correspond directly to sales of the tying product.
Because customers purchasing the tying product must also purchase the tied product, a
higher absolute price for the tying product results. For in-depth discussions of this
relationship see P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs 533 (2d ed. 1974); R. POSNER,
ANTrrRusT LAW 173-80 (1976); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Prob-
lem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 25-27 (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw.
U.L. REv. 62, 78-83 (1960); Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither
a Borrower, Nor a Lender Be," 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 15-16; Ferguson, Tying Arrange-
ments and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROM. 552, 554-
58 (1965); Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397,
1431-59 (1967); Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 CoLum. L. REv. 1121, 1127-
31 (1983); Stigler, United States v. Loew's, Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SuP.
CT. REy. 152, 152-54.
:1 Accord Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 508-09
(1975); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-71 (1965); United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962); Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 2, 6
(1958). In Fortner I, Justice White stated:
There is general agreement in the cases and among commentators that
the fundamental restraint against which the tying proscription is meant to
guard is the use of power over one product to attain power over another,
or otherwise to distort freedom of trade and competition in the second pro-
duct. This distortion injures the buyers of the second product, who because
of their preference for the seller's brand of the first are artificially forced to
make a less than optimal choice in the second. And even if the customer is
indifferent among brands of the second product and therefore loses nothing
by agreeing to use the seller's brand of the second in order to get his brand
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 75
The per se rule was first utilized in International Salt Co. v.
United States.21 In International Salt, the defendant, Interna-
tional Salt Company, owned patented canning machines which
were technologically superior to all others on the marketY The
company leased their machines subject to the stipulation that
the lessees purchase all salt used in operating these machines
from the defendant. 23 The Supreme Court found that these leases
violated section 3 of the Clayton Actz4 because when Interna-
tional Salt's patents, providing the necessary market power z  in
of the first, such tying agreements may work significant restraints on com-
petition in the tied product. The tying seller may be working toward a
monopoly position in the tied product and, even if he is not, the practice of
tying forecloses other sellers of the tied product and makes it more difficult
for new firms to enter that market. They must be prepared not only to match
existing sellers of the tied product in price and quality, but to offset the attraction
of the tying product itself. Even if this is possible through simultaneous
entry into production of the tying product, entry into both markets is
significantly more expensive than simple entry into the tied market, and
shifting buying habits in the tied product is considerably more cumbersome
and less responsive to variations in competitive offers. In addition to these
anti-competitive effects in the tied product, tying arrangements may be
used to evade price control in the tying product through clandestine transfer
of the profit to the tied product; they may be used as a counting device
to effect price discrimination; and they may be used to force a full line of
products on the customer so as to extract more easily from him a monopoly
return on one unique product in the line.
394 U.S. at 512-14 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
21 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). The per se doctrine evolved from Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), where the Court held that a
tying arrangement would have the effect of enlarging a patent monopoly. Id. at 518.
See also Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 70-73 (1912) (White, C.J., dissenting) (contracts
requiring use of unpatented materials should be per se invalid).
2 332 U.S. at 396-97.
2 Id. at 394.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1986). In enacting § 3 of the Clayton Act, Congress emphasized
its great concern about the anti-competitive effect of tying arrangements. See H.R. REP.
No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-13 (1914); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9
(1914).
1 As an economic matter, market power exists whenever prices can be raised above
those levels which would be charged in a competitive market. See United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977); 394 U.S. at 503-04. Market
power allows the use of force, i.e., the forcing of an item upon customers that they do
not necessarily want to purchase. When such "forcing" is present, competition for sales
of the tied item is restrained in the market and the Sherman Act is violated.
Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public weal
is that goods must stand the cold test of competition; that the public,
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the tying product (the machines), 26 were combined with the
substantial amount of business from which competitors were
foreclosed, a negative effect on competition arose. The Court,
therefore, characterized such agreements as per se unlawful.
27
The Court declared not only that price fixing was illegal but
also that it was per se unlawful to foreclose competitors from
any substantial markets. 28
B. Times-Picayune: Move Towards a Rule of Reason Approach?
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States29 narrowed
the holding in International Salt)0 In Times-Picayune, a news-
paper with both morning and evening editions, whose only com-
petition was another evening paper,"' had required advertisers to
advertise in both editions. 32 The government, assuming that ad-
vertisers would not advertise in both evening papers, contended
that this tying arrangement foreclosed the other evening paper
from potential business.3 3 The Supreme Court found that, be-
cause the Times-Picayune did not occupy a dominant position
in the market, advertising opportunities of the other paper were
not foreclosed.34 The Court further concluded that the antitrust
acting through the market's impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Na-
tion's resources and thus direct the course its economic development will
take.... By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of
another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment
as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates it from the competitive
stresses of the open market. But any intrinsic superiority of the 'tied'
product would convince freely buyers to select it over others anyway.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
332 U.S. at 395-97.
Id. at 396-97.
Id. See generally 429 U.S. at 620; 394 U.S. at 503-04; 371 U.S. at 45, 48 n.5.
The per se approach attempts to avoid a costly and difficult examination of
market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anti-competitive conduct is so
great that an examination of market conditions is unnecessary. See, e.g., Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1982) (fee schedules establishing
maximum fee for physician services held per se illegal price fixing).
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
345 U.S. at 600.
Id. at 596-97.
Id. at 599-601.
" Id. at 611-13.
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laws were violated only when the plaintiff could show that the
defendant held a monopoly in the tying product and that a
substantial volume of commerce in the tied product would be
affected.
35
This decision was a step backward from International Salt
which held that an antitrust violation existed if either of Times-
Picayune's requirements were present. 36 Most important, the
Times-Picayune Court held there was no tying arrangement be-
cause there were not two distinct products as viewed by the
public.3 7 In essence, the Court retracted its per se approach,
suggesting instead that the facts of each case should be evaluated
independently under a "rule of reason. ' 38
C. Northern Pacific: A Return to Per Se Scrutiny?
The "rule of reason" approach alluded to in Times-Picayune
was soon rejected in Northern Pacific Railroad v. United States39
as the Court drifted back toward per se scrutiny. 40 In Northern
Pacific, the Northern Pacific Railroad had sold and leased land
adjoining its rail lines with contracts requiring the purchasers or
lessees to ship any goods produced on these lands via the rail-
road. 41 The United States brought suit alleging the railroad was
implementing an illegal tying arrangement. 42 The Court's opinion
11 Id. at 608-09.
36 332 U.S. at 395-97.
37 345 U.S. at 613-15. There must be two distinct products for a tying agreement
to be present. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 176-78 (1931) (no
tie-in because "straight run" and "cracked" gasoline not distinct products); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (no tie-in because
"virgin" and "secondary" aluminum ingots not distinct products).
" Id. at 614.
" 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Cf. Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer
Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268, 278-80 (1934) (per se rule applied if any "restraint of
competition" shown).
40 356 U.S. at 6. See generally 345 U.S. at 606; 332 U.S. at 396. Cf. United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948) (practice of "block-booking"
held illegal per se); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948) (practice need
not be intended to restrain trade or build a monopoly to be illegal). The Court, in
Northern Pacific, reiterated that the only purpose of a tying arrangement is to suppress
competition. 356 U.S. at 6.
41 356 U.S. at 2-4.
42 Id. at 3-4.
[Vol. 75
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confirmed the per se test elucidated in International Salt.4 The
Court again declared that the proper standard of illegality re-
quired that an entity have sufficient economic power to appre-
ciably restrain commerce in the tied product and that a substantial
amount of interstate commerce be affected." In essence, the
Court abandoned the standard promulgated in Times-Picayune
by failing to require any absolute evidence of substantial market
power in the tying product market.4 5
The Supreme Court strengthened the per se approach to tying
agreements in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp.46 ("Fortner I"). In Fortner I, the United States Steel
Company had offered attractive credit terms and financing to
individuals who purchased its prefabricated homes. The plaintiff
alleged that these credit terms induced buyers to purchase homes
that were over-priced and defective. 47
The Fortner I Court found that United States Steel's offer
of one hundred percent financing at below market rates and its
large yearly sales in the prefabricated housing market, from
which competitors were foreclosed by the tying arrangement,
was unlawful. 41 The Court rejected the argument that these
attractive credit terms were available through United States Steel's
large economies of scale, stating that, if this were true, cost
savings should be passed on to the consumer in the form of
lower retail prices for the tied product. 49 Because this case was
an appeal of the district court's summary judgment award, the
Court remanded the case for a determination of United States
Steel's market power in the product market.5 0
41 Id. at 9-11.
" Id. at 6.
4, Id. at 11-13.
394 U.S. 495 (1969).
, Id. at 496-97.
" Id. at 497, 500.
" Id. at 506-09. The Court also rejected the argument that the arrangement
involved only a single product. Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227
(1947) (fact that defendants constituted a "vertically integrated enterprise" does not
remove them from Sherman Act prohibitions); Perma Line Mufflers, 392 U.S. 134, 141-
42 (1967) (common ownership of two distinct entities does not relieve defendants of
restraints of antitrust laws); Kiefer Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215
(1951) ("common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from... anti-trust
laws").
ro 394 U.S. at 497.
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Eight years later, the Supreme Court considered whether United
States Steel had power in the credit market in United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc.5 ("Fortner IF'). The Court narrowed
its earlier Fortner I holding by requiring the plaintiff to show that
United States Steel had "significant" power in the credit market, 2
giving the impression the Court was shifting away from a standard
of rigid illegality of tying arrangements.5 3 The Court restated,
however, adherence to the per se rule in even broader terms.5 4 The
Fortner 11 opinion suggested a new direction, declaring that the
purchase requirement was only a prerequisite for the loan.5 The
Court emphasized that the plaintiff had not been forced to accept
the favorable credit terms but rather that the low financing had
been the most attractive terms United States Steel could offer. 6
The drift of the United States Supreme Court away from a
rigid per se scrutiny of tying arrangements has been clearly
illustrated by past decisions.57 The Court continued this progres-
sion in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.53
II. THE Jefferson Parish DECISION
In 1971, East Jefferson Hospital entered a contractual ar-
rangement with Roux & Associates ("Roux"), a physician group
founded by Dr. Kermit Roux.5 9 The agreement required Dr.
Roux to provide anesthesiology services for the hospital's oper-
ating rooms and required the hospital to furnish the space,
equipment, support staff, medication, and services necessary to
operate the anesthesiology department. Dr. Roux was to have
control over the nursing staff of the department. East Jefferson
Hospital also agreed to restrict the employment of anesthesiol-
$- 429 U.S. 610 (1977). Fortner I litigated the standards to be applied in a motion
for summary judgment in a civil antitrust action, but did not examine whether a per se
violation could be proven.
12 Id. at 619.
'3 Id. at 619-20.
Id. at 615-17.
Id. at 619-22.
Id. at 613-17.
1" See supra notes 29-37, 46-56 and accompanying text.
', 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
" Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 5-6 (1984).
[Vol. 75
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ogists solely to those under contract with Dr. Roux for the
duration of the agreement.60
In 1976, the contract was renewed with an amendment which
no longer excluded other anesthesiologists from practicing at
East Jefferson. The hospital, on its own accord, however, con-
tinued to allow only Dr. Roux and his associates to perform
anesthesiology services. This agreement affected two distinct parts
of the economy. Patients were not allowed to choose an anes-
thesiologist when they were treated at East Jefferson and other
anesthesiologists were foreclosed from practicing at the hospi-
tal.6'
One year later, Dr. Edwin Hyde, a board certified anesthe-
siologist, applied for staff privileges62 at East Jefferson Hospital.
The credentials committee63 and the medical staff executive
committee64 recommended that his application be approved but
the hospital board denied him privileges based on the hospital's
contract with Dr. Roux. Dr. Hyde sued East Jefferson Hospital
and its board of trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the contract was illegal and an injunction requiring that East
Jefferson grant him staff privileges.
6 5
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6-7.
,2 Staff privileges constitute the right of physicians to admit their personal patients
to a hospital and perform at the hospital any procedures for which the physicians qualify
on those patients. The denial of staff privileges has been heavily litigated. As to public
hospitals, see Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173
(5th Cir. 1971); Martino v. Concord Community Hosp. Dist., 43 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal.
1965); Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal. 1962); Group
Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 237 P.2d 737 (Wash. 1951). As to private
hospitals, see Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Mulvihill v. Julia Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F.
Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1963);
Woodland v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 217 A.2d 37 (Vt. 1966). See generally Hein, Hospital
Staff Privileges and the Courts: Practice and Prognosis, 34 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 157
(Wint. 1984); McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying, Suspending, and Granting
Staff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 175 (1980).
11 The credentials committee usually reviews all applications for staff privileges to
determine if the physician is professionally qualified to practice at the hospital in question.
" The medical staff executive committee usually has authority regarding all aspects
of the medical staff. This includes ensuring that the staff physicians maintain their
professional qualifications and that they continue to follow hospital guidelines.
" 466 U.S. at 5-6. Dr. Hyde brought action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law
1986-87]
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The district court, after a two-day bench trial, dismissed Dr.
Hyde's claim, concluding that the anti-competitive effects of the
Roux contract were minimal and outweighed by the benefits of
improved patient care.6 6 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the contract to
be per se illegal because each person using East Jefferson's
operating rooms was denied a choice in anesthesiologists. 67
The Supreme Court struck down the court of appeals' deci-
sion, holding that the hospital's contract with Dr. Roux did not
constitute an unlawful tying arrangement.68 The majority noted
that the exclusive anesthesiology contract did not restrain com-
petition among anesthesiologists because there were twenty hos-
pitals in the area and Dr. Roux only had a contract with one.69
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor scrutinized the Roux con-
tract under the "rule of reason.''70 She concluded the agreement
was legal7' and appeared to call for the abandonment of per se
scrutiny in tying arrangements. 72
III. THE DICHOTOMY OF REASONING
A. Majority: No Antitrust Violation Under Per Se and "Rule
of Reason" Analysis
1. Review Under Per Se Scrutiny
Jefferson Parish73 is the first United States Supreme Court
decision to hold that a physician-hospital contract granting a
physician group the exclusive right to provide all required health
care services needed by a hospital's patients conforms to federal
as well as the Sherman Act. The former charges, however, were dismissed by the district
court.
a Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1981).
Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982).
61 466 U.S. at 31-32.
61 Id. at 29.
Id. at 41-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 Id.
Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4-5 (1984).
[Vol. 75
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antitrust laws. This unanimous verdict74 is the first to confront
this issue and has had a significant impact on the contracting of
medical services by health care providers.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens declared that the
Court was confronted by two issues. The first issue was whether
the contract in question was a per se violation of federal antitrust
laws because each patient undergoing surgery at East Jefferson
was required to use a member of the Roux group as his anes-
thesiologist.75 The second issue was whether the physician-hos-
pital contract restricted competition among anesthesiologists by
foreclosing them from practicing at East Jefferson.
76
In his opinion, Justice Stevens mandated that the existence
of power to coerce the purchase of the tied product is an essential
requirement for finding an unlawful tying arrangement.7 7 He
emphasized that every refusal to sell two products separately is
not per se unlawful. Central to Justice Stevens' premise was that
where the ability to purchase tied products individually exists
elsewhere in the competitive market, the selling of products in
74 Although unanimous, there was a concurring opinion written by Justice O'Con-
nor in which Justices Burger, Powell and Rehnquist joined. In addition, Justice Marshall
joined with Justice Brennan in a one paragraph concurrence, although each also joined
Stevens' majority opinion. Id.
Id. at 4-5.
7' Id.
" Id. at 12. See Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
Although anesthesiological services are directly dependent on other services provided by
the hospital, the Roux contract would not automatically be rejected from being a tying
arrangement. Previously, the Supreme Court has found directly dependent and interre-
lated products to be illegally tied. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392, 397-98 (1947) (salt machine and salt); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320
U.S. 661, 671 (heating system and stoker switch), reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 802 (1944);
Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1942) (salt machine and salt),
reh'g denied, 315 U.S. 826 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 462-
63 (1938) (process patent and material used in the patented process); International
Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936) (tabulators and
tabulating punch cards); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27,
30 (1931) (ice cream transportation package and coolant); FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 263
U.S. 463, 472 (1923) (gasoline and underground tanks and pumps); United Shoe Mach.
Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 462-64 (1922) (shoe machinery and supplies, main-
tenance, and peripheral machinery); United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545, 558-60 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (components of television antennas), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567
(per curiam), reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 890 (1961). In some situations, the interdependency
between the two products may allow the seller to maximize its return on the tying
product by charging a higher price to a larger user of the tying product.
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a single package is only an attempt to compete effectively.78 It
is therefore important to differentiate between an agreement such
as the one between Dr. Roux and East Jefferson and an agree-
ment between a hospital and its patients where the hospital
requires that its patients purchase from a physician group like
Roux, an agreement which would create a tying arrangement.
Justice Stevens differentiated the two types saying that, although
the hospital was able to impose the requirement on its patients,
Dr. Roux's agreement with East Jefferson only provided for
supplying the hospital's needs.7 9 He emphasized that tying ar-
rangements are only illegal in the presence of market power,80
and that a per se scrutiny should only be implemented if the
existence of force is probable.81
Because, under Times-Picayune, two distinct and separate
products must be present to find a tying arrangement and thus
an antitrust violation,82 Justice Stevens then considered whether
two or more products existed."3 The majority concluded that the
hospital did sell two distinct products: hospital and anesthesiol-
ogy services. The existence of force, however, was not found,
an absence which precluded invoking per se scrutiny and thus
finding an illegal tying arrangement.
8 4
Citing a possible basis for implementing the per se approach,
the majority noted that 30°o of the patients in the surrounding
area enter East Jefferson possibly because it is the closest hos-
pital. This, however, was not found to be indicative of market
power. 5 Justice Stevens' opinion acknowledged that neither East
71 466 U.S. at 11-12. See Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495, 517-18 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) and 524-25 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
, 466 U.S. at 18 n.28.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14 (1953).
"Market power" is defined as the ability to force a purchaser to act contrary to how
he would have acted in a competitive market. Id. at 613-14.
11 466 U.S. at 15-16.
82 Id. at 21-25. See 345 U.S. at 613-15; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283
U.S. 163, 176-78 (1931); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d
Cir. 1945). Cf. Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing
Co., 293 U.S. 268, 278-80 (1934) (publishing journal and obtaining advertising for
journal held not separate services).
83 466 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 26-27.
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Jefferson's market share nor market imperfections, such as the
existence of third party paymentss6 which both reduce competi-
tion and can create a lack of adequate knowledge in the mar-
ketplace, 7 indicated that the defendant possessed enough market
power to find a violation of federal antitrust laws.8S
The majority opinion declared that tying arrangements were
only unlawful when the consumer was forced to make purchases
he did not wish to make. Justice Stevens emphasized that a lack
of competition in the price or quality of a service does not create
or indicate the existence of force. 9 In reaching his decision,
Justice Stevens first assumed that every patient undergoing sur-
gery at East Jefferson required the services of an anesthesiologist
and then noted that there was no evidence that the hospital had
forced anesthesiology services on any unwilling patients.90 The
failure of the record to indicate the presence of force removed
any justification for the Court to apply per se scrutiny to the
Roux-East Jefferson contract. 9'
2. Review Under the "Rule of Reason"
Upon determining the inapplicability of per se scrutiny, the
majority then addressed the Roux contract, using a "rule of
reason." The burden was placed upon the plaintiff to demon-
strate that the Roux contract unreasonably restrained competi-
tion. 2 The majority first defined the relevant market affected
by the contract, finding the relevant market not necessarily
" Third party payments are payments made by private insurers such as Blue Cross
and Blue Shield, Medicare, Medicaid, or other insurance groups, in contrast to those
made by the individual receiving treatment.
I Where market imperfections exist, purchasers may not be fully sensitive to the
price or quality implications of a tying arrangement, hence the tie-in may impede
competition on the merits. See Craswell, supra note 5, at 675-79.
"1 466 U.S. at 27. Congress has found that these market imperfections exist. See Na-
tional Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388 n.13, 391-92, 393 n.18; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300k, 300k-2(b) (1986); S. REP. No. 96-96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1979); H.R.
CoNt. REp. No. 96-420, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1979).
466 U.S. at 27-28. Although there was some contrary evidence, it was equivocal
and the lower courts made no findings of fact.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 22-29.
Id. at 29-31.
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synonymous with the market to which East Jefferson Hospital
offered services. Justice Stevens did not limit the market defi-
nition to a specific geographic area. He noted that the record
provided insufficient evidence to prove that the Roux contract,
as it operated, unreasonably restrained competition. The record
further failed to indicate either that a substantial percentage of
patients wanted to negotiate separately for anesthesiology serv-
ices or that a reasonable number of patients realized they could
do soy
In addition, Justice Stevens declared that even if Dr. Roux
did not have an exclusive contract with the hospital, patient
choices would be restricted by the hospital's inherent right to
govern and limit the physicians allowed to practice at the hos-
pital.9 4 The majority rejected the contention that limiting patient
choice in selecting an anesthesiologist created an adverse effect
on competition. 95 Although a small number of patients might
have been affected, there was no indication the market as a
whole would be. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the
price, quality, supply, or demand of hospital or anesthesiological
services would be affected.9 6 The majority emphasized that the
plaintiff had made no showing that the Roux contract foreclosed
so much of the market from competing anesthesiologists as to
unreasonably restrain competition in the market for anesthesiol-
ogy services.
97
B. Justice O'Connor: Tying and Exclusive Dealing Claims
Should Receive "'Rule of Reason" Scrutiny
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with
Justice Stevens that the Roux contract did not violate federal
antitrust laws, 98 but rejected the majority's opinion that the
93 Id. at 29-30.
4 Id. at 30.
93 Id.
6 Id. at 31. A contract is illegal if it forecloses a large part of any one market
from competition. See generally Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,
325-28 (1961); Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299-314
(1949).
466 U.S. at 31-32.
466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984). Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
joined in Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
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agreement should be considered under a per se approach. Justice
O'Connor instead adopted the "rule of reason," 99 considering it
the proper standard regardless of whether the Roux agreement
was treated as an exclusive dealing arrangement or as a tying
arrangement.00
Justice O'Connor argued that application of the per se rule
in tying cases necessitated an in-depth investigation into the
economic effects of the tying arrangement. Thus, that doctrine
incurred the high cost of the "rule of reason" scrutiny without
achieving its benefits.101 Her concurrence emphasized that the
per se doctrine required an "extensive and time-consuming eco-
nomic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, but then may
be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that economic analysis
would show to be beneficial." 10 2 She also noted that the per se
doctrine often was misinterpreted by lower courts which omitted
the necessary economic analysis. 103
Justice O'Connor advocated total abandonment of the per se
label in tying arrangements '0 with the adverse economic effects
and potential benefits instead scrutinized under a "rule of reason."
Utilization of this rule would subject tying arrangements to the
same level of review as other anti-competitive agreements.' 5
91 466 U.S. at 35. "Tie-ins" usually receive a per se analysis while exclusive
contracts receive "rule of reason" analysis. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 34.
I02 Id.
Id. at 34-35.
11 Id. at 35.
"I' Id. O'Connor stated that by abandoning the per se test, tying arrangements
would be evaluated under the same standard as all other anti-competitive restraints,
except for a few horizontal or quasi-horizontal restraints that lack any economic benefits.
She advocated that this would justify the tie-in doctrine as it is now utilized.
O'Connor described tying law as anomolous because similar arrangements are generally
evaluated under the rule of reason.
For example, the "per se" analysis of tie-ins subjects restrictions on a
franchisee's freedom to purchase supplies to a more searching scrutiny
than restrictions on his freedom to sell his products. Compare, e.g., Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47-52 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972), with Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977). And exclusive contracts, that, like tie-ins, require
the buyer to purchase from one seller, are subject only to the rule of
1986-87]
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Justice O'Connor maintained that under the "rule of rea-
son," tying arrangements should be held unlawful only when they
have "a demonstrably exclusionary impact in the tied-product
market" or when they abet the harmful exercise of market power
by the seller in the tying product market.'0 6 Justice O'Connor found
tying to be economically harmful where market power in the tying
product market is used to expand power in the tied product market,
but noted that the probability of such a relationship occurring was
unlikely unless the markets in question and the nature of the pro-
ducts met three criteria.'0 7
First, "the seller must have power in the tying product
market."' 10 Second, the seller must pose a substantial threat of
obtaining market power in the tied market product. 0 9 Finally,
the tying and tied products must be distinct and distinguishable
on a "coherent economic basis."" 0 The existence of these three
conditions, however, does not necessarily indicate that the tying
arrangement is unlawful. " Justice O'Connor emphasized that these
conditions are merely "threshold requirements" in applying the rule
of reason to a tying agreement. Once met, the inquiry shifts to
focus on whether a tie-in's economic benefits outweigh its adverse
impact on competition.
'" 2
Justice O'Connor assumed that East Jefferson Hospital had
market power in providing hospital services in its area and that
the hospital would acquire market power by providing anesthe-
reason.
Id. at 35 n.2. See generally P. ARBEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs 735 (3d ed. 1981); R. Boax,
THE ANTiTRusT PARADOX 372-74 (1978).
016 466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1' Id. at 36-37.
,o3 Id. at 37. Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610,
617-18, 618 n.8, (1977); Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
498-99 (1969); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953);
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). Accord Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 371, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965) (oil and rubber companies
found to have sufficient market power in tying product).
109 466 U.S. at 38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.
112 Id. at 41-42.
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siological services in the area.11 3 She found, however, that the
third condition was not met. In her opinion, there was no
economic foundation for treating surgery and anesthesia services
as separate services, thereby preventing the hospital from ac-
quiring additional market power by tying the sale of these serv-
ices.114
Justice O'Connor argued that, even if the services were dis-
tinct products, the tying arrangement did not violate the federal
antitrust laws because the arrangement could not increase the
seller's market power.1 5 Believing it very unlikely that a patient
would opt for surgery without anesthesia, Justice O'Connor
found the Roux agreement presented little harm to the hospital's
patients. On the contrary, she cited many potential benefits of
contracting with one physician group. 1 6 Such an arrangement
theoretically ensured more efficient services and facilities while
allowing more effective scheduling with around-the-clock cov-
erage. Furthermore, the arrangement permitted the hospital to
maintain easily the quality of care, removed the responsibility
of selecting an anesthesiologist from the patient, and avoided
burdening the hospital with full responsibility for the anesthe-
siologist. 117 In short, Justice O'Connor determined that there
were substantial benefits in contrast to slight drawbacks.11 8
Upon concluding that an illegal tying agreement was not
present, Justice O'Connor briefly examined the potential exist-
ence of an exclusive dealing contract. As had the majority, she
utilized a "rule of reason" approach in examining the Roux
contract as a potential exclusive dealing contract,1' 9 citing Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. United States,1 20 which held exclusive dealing
contracts unlawful only when a significant amount of purchasers
and sellers were prevented from entering the market. 21 In the
situation before the Court, however, Justice O'Connor deter-
Id. at 42.
I d. at 43.
x Id.
": Id.
' Id. at 43-44.
" Id. at 43.
Id. at 44-47.
337 U.S. 293 (1949).
1 466 U.S. at 45. See 337 U.S. at 299-314.
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mined that only a small part of the potential market was fore-
closed to other anesthesiologists because there were twenty
hospitals in the area with only one, East Jefferson, closed to
them.12,
IV. THE PROGENY OF Jefferson Parish
Since Jefferson Parish, several decisions have interpreted and
expanded upon the Supreme Court's reasoning.'2 Most have
relied heavily upon the Court's determination that exclusive em-
ployment agreements do not necessarily constitute or result in
forced tying arrangements. 124
One of the first post-Jefferson Parish cases was Ezpeleta v. The
Sisters of Mercy Health Corp.,25 where an anesthesiologist whose
staff privileges had been terminated sought reinstatement and
monetary compensation.12 6 In support of her claim, she alleged that
the hospital engaged in an illegal tying arrangement, because the
performance of surgery was tied to receiving anesthesiology ser-
vices from those physicians who had exclusive practice privileges
at the hospital.
27
The Ezpeleta court found that because the hospital lacked
the 30% market share present in Jefferson Parish, the hospital's
actions were not per se illegal. 28 The plaintiff's argument was
found unpersuasive because it mistakenly focused on the effect
of the hospital's exclusive service contract on the plaintiff and
not on the patients in the market or on other competing anes-
thesiologists.1
29
In addition, the court declared that the exclusive service
contract did not unreasonably restrain competition among anes-
thesiologists. It ignored the plaintiff's demonstration of her lost
income and apparent inability to practice anethesiology at other
area hospitals. 130 Although admitting that the plaintiff had suf-
2 466 U.S. at 45-46.
"2 See infra notes 125, 132, 148, 190 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
2 621 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 119 (1986).
- Id. at 1266-67.
'" Id. at 1267.
'z' Id. at 1269.
119 Id. at 1268-70.
130 Id.
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fered because of defendant's actions, the court concluded that
nothing demonstrated that economic injury had been suffered
by either the hospital's patients or other anesthesiologists. 131
The relatively small market share possessed by the hospital
in Ezpeleta made the court's decision relatively easy to reach.
In McMorris v. Williamsport Hospital,132 however, a court was
confronted with a hospital that had a 55-60% share in the
relative market."' In McMorris, a physician, Dr. McMorris,
brought an action against Williamsport Hospital and its Board
of Trustees challenging the hospital's right to remove him as
director of its radiology department.1 34 Dr. McMorris further
questioned the hospital's ability to offer another physician the
exclusive right to provide all radiological services at the hospi-
tal.13s
The facts indicated that other physicians at the hospital had
ordered nuclear tests and requested that Dr. McMorris interpret
the results.13 6 Dr. Gouldin, who had exclusive privileges at the
hospital, however, denied these requests, stating that "it was her
department" and she alone would interpret any results. 37 Dr.
McMorris asserted that this arrangement constituted an illegal
tie-in because the hospital forced its nuclear medicine patients
to purchase Dr. Gouldin's services, and thus restrained compe-
tition among nuclear medicine physicians in the relevant mar-
ket. 138
The court recognized the importance of the fact that physi-
cians at the hospital had requested that Dr. McMorris interpret
the results of the tests they ordered and that the physicians
stopped requesting Dr. McMorris's services because of Dr. Goul-
din's exclusive contract. 39 Evaluating the antitrust implications,
I" d. at 1270.
597 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
"7 Id. at 913.
-4 Id. at 908-09.
"' Id. at 908.
Id. at 908 n.5.
" Id.
" d. at 910-11.
Id. Although this was not a determining factor, the court did find it to be
significant enough to discuss it in a footnote. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying
text.
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the court first determined that the hospital possessed a 55-60%
market share with respect to nuclear medicine procedures.
14°
Further, certain procedures were performed only at Williamsport
Hospital. 141 As a result of these findings, the McMorris court
held that there was enough evidence potentially to find an illegal
tying arrangement.1 42
The court acknowledged that many factual dissimilarities
with Jefferson Parish made the existence of an illegal tying
arrangement an extremely close question.1 43 Unlike Jefferson
Parish where patients received separate bills for the hospital's
services and the anesthesiologist's services,'" Williamsport Hos-
pital did not bill its patients separately for Dr. Gouldin's serv-
ices.' 45 Furthermore, Dr. Gouldin received a salary from the
hospital. 46 The court concluded that these factors weighed against
finding that Dr. Gouldin's and the hospital's services were dis-
tinct products, which prevented granting the defendants a sum-
mary judgment.1
47
In Konik v. Champlain Valley Physician's Hospital,'4 1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
a challenge to a physician-hospital contract by a competing
group of physicians, 49 justifying its decision on the Jefferson
Parish holding.5 0 Central to the court's conclusion was the
premise that a hospital has the right to determine which physi-
cians may practice at the hospital.' 5' .
Konik involved a physician who challenged the removal and
subsequent denial of her practice privileges at Valley Physician's
Hospital. 52 Dr. Konik had been a member of a physician group
110 Id. at 912-13.
141 Id. at 913.
142 Id.
"4 Id. at 912.
'" Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 22 (1984).
141 597 F. Supp. at 912.
14 Id.
147 Id.
143 733 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians
Hospital Medical Center, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
149 Id. at 1009.
- Id. at 1007-08.
' Id. at 1014-15.
'sz Id. at 1009.
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which had the exclusive right to provide anesthesiology services
at the hospital. After resigning from the physician group over
personal differences, Dr. Konik attempted to negotiate her own
contract with the hospital.'53 The hospital offered Dr. Konik the
same contract it had with the physician group, but Dr. Konik
rejected it. The hospital then denied Dr. Konik anesthesiology
privileges at the hospital, but allowed her to retain her senior
staff privileges.
1 4
Dr. Konik alleged that the hospital tied the use of its oper-
ating facilities to the purchase of anesthesiology services from
the physician group. 5 The court held that under its interpreta-
tion of Jefferson Parish, the hospital's operating facilities and
anesthesiology services were separate services. The court ac-
knowledged that the hospital required patients using its operating
facilities to purchase anesthesiology services from an anesthe-
siologist licensed at the hospital.' 6 In rejecting the plaintiff's
claims, however, the court noted that the hospital had not lim-
ited practice privileges solely to members of the physician group,
as evidenced by the contract it had offered Dr. Konik. ' 7 The
court emphasized that the hospital was simply limiting practice
privileges to those with whom it had contracted and recognized
that under Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,5s every
contract excluded, at least to some degree, those who were not
parties to it. 59
The court differentiated Konik from Jefferson Parish in that,
in Jefferson Parish, East Jefferson Hospital had a closed anes-
thesiology department with only one physician group allowed to
practice at the hospital. 60 Thus, the court declared that the
circumstances in Jefferson Parish which led the United States
"I Id. at 1010-11. All physicians holding anesthesiology staff privileges at the
hospital were shareholders or employees of the physician group, even though the group
did not have a formal contract with the hospital.
Id. at 1011.
'" Id.
Id. at 1017-18.
,4 Id.
246 U.S. 231 (1918). "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Id. at 238.
733 F.2d at 1014-15.
Id. at 1018.
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Supreme Court to find a tying arrangement did not exist in
Konik.161
V. Jefferson Parish AND ITS PROGENY: PosrrmvE RESULTS wrrH
POTENTIALLY BROAD IMPLICATIONS
As a continuation of efforts to set forth a workable integra-
tion of previous United States Supreme Court decisions, 162 Jef-
ferson Parish reaffirms those decisions while breaking new
ground. The Court's decision in Jefferson Parish guarantees
physician groups the right to have an exclusive contract with a
hospital while recognizing the public's interest in receiving cost-
efficient health care.' 6' The Court's enumeration of guidelines
will enable subsequent courts and health care providers to more
effectively and efficiently assess the antitrust laws as they relate
to the health care industry. Jefferson Parish is the logical con-
clusion to earlier decisions because it acknowledges the impor-
tance of both the antitrust laws and more cost-efficient health
care.
The Supreme Court's recognition of the need for more ef-
ficient health care is important. The delivery of health care in
the United States is presently beset by runaway costs and ex-
penditures. 64 While many people cannot afford necessary health
care, the government is reducing its health care expenditures. 6
S
361 Id.
161 See supra notes 29-37, 46-56 and accompanying text.
'6' See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29-32, 31 n.52,
43-44 (1984).
164
National Health Expenditures
Total
Year (bil.) Per Capita % of GNP
1960 $ 26.9 $ 146 5.3
1965 41.9 207 6.1
1970 75.0 350 7.6
1975 132.7 591 8.6
1980 248.0 1,049 9.4
1983 355.1 1,461 10.7
1984 387.4 1,580 10.6
Statistical Abstract of the United States 96 (1986).
161 Total government expenditures for Medicare were reduced 1% effective March
1, 1986. H.R.J. REs. 672, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (ratifying and affirming Seques-
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In order to ensure delivery of high quality, cost-efficient health
care in the United States, expenses must be reduced. One possible
solution is to grant health care providers more autonomy.
Health care providers should be encouraged to provide the
most cost-efficient health care. By allowing an institutional prov-
ider, such as a hospital, to determine the method of providing
the most efficient health care, the Court will ensure that health
care providers seek the most favorable means of doing so. Health
care providers must be allowed to operate in the manner they
see necessary to avoid the ills of socialized medicine. Arguably,
hospitals presently do not have total self-autonomy and have
little incentive to operate more efficiently. Much of the federal
reimbursement of hospitals in the past for delivering health care
has been on a "state" or "hospital" specific basis.1
66
Closed staffing of certain departments of a hospital allows
a hospital to act more efficiently. 67 Administrative costs are
reduced because a limited number of people hold practice priv-
ileges. Furthermore, the hospital can maintain quality control
by carefully supervising those few physicians granted practice
tration Report for Fiscal Year 1986-A Joint Report to the Comptroller General of the
United States, 51 Fed. Reg. 1917, 1934 (1986)). As the government comes to grips with
a shrinking budget, federal spending on health care will be reduced further.
11, See, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. 34,728 (1984). See also 42 C.F.R. § 405.401 et seq.
(1985) (stating principles of reimbursement to hospital-based physicians).
In the words of Justice O'Connor:
The tie-in improves patient care and permits more efficient hospital
operation in a number of ways. From the viewpoint of hospital manage-
ment, the tie-in ensures 24 hour anesthesiology coverage, aids in standard-
ization of procedures and efficient use of equipment, facilitates flexible
scheduling of operations, and permits the hospital more effectively to
monitor the quality of anesthesiological services. Further, the tying arrange-
ment is advantageous to patients because,... the closed anesthesiology
department places upon the hospital, rather than the individual patient,
responsibility to select the physician who is to provide anesthesiological
services. The hospital also assumes the responsibility that the anesthesiol-
ogist will be available, will be acceptable to the surgeon, and will provide
suitable care to the patient. In assuming these responsibilities-responsi-
bilities that a seriously ill patient frequently may be unable to discharge-
the hospital provides a valuable service to its patients. And there is no
indication that patients were dissatisfied with the quality of anesthesiology
that was provided at the hospital or that patients wished to enjoy the
services of anesthesiologists other than those that the hospital employed.
466 U.S. at 43-44.
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facilities at a hospital. This is especially important in those
specialties in which only a few physicians are needed to staff a
particular department. As long as closed staffing protects the
interest of the public, exclusive contracting by health care prov-
iders should be respected.
The continued increase in health care costs should encourage
the courts to reconsider their present treatment of health care
providers under the antitrust laws. If more efficient low-cost
health care can be delivered in contravention of the antitrust
laws, consideration should be given to granting a limited exemp-
tion to health care providers. In Jefferson Parish, the United
States Supreme Court seemed to recognize the possibility of such
an exemption by emphasizing the importance of delivering high
quality cost-efficient health care. Presently, professional baseball
enjoys a judicially-created exemption from the antitrust laws.
63
Health care providers arguably should be granted a limited ex-
emption similar to professional baseball's in certain situations.
If such an exemption were found unsuccessful in reducing health
care costs, it could easily be revoked. Courts must not look for
a quick solution but rather a long term plan to provide low-cost
quality health care.
The Jefferson Parish decision is a logical place to start.
Previous court decisions simply have defined the standards to
which health care providers must conform. These standards have
not addressed the problems confronting the health care industry
today. More action is needed in the area of providing affordable
health care to all citizens. This goal can be accomplished through
judicial review of the economic effects of any potential antitrust
violation. Justice O'Connor's concurrence took such a step in
utilizing a "rule of reason" analysis to exclusive contracts and
'" See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-85 (1972) (reluctantly upheld exemption
on ground that Congress, not the Court, should remove it); Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357, reh'g denied, 346 U.S. 917 (1953) (upheld exemption on
ground that only Congress should remove it); Federal Baseball Club v. National League,
259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (created "exemption" on Court's finding that professional
baseball is not a part of interstate commerce). See also L. LOWENFISH & T. LuPrIN,
THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND 88, 91, 105, 212 (1980); Jacobs and Winter, Antitrust Principles
and Collective Bargaining of Athletes, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 21-28 (1971); Morris, In the
Wake of Flood, 38 LAW & CoNTEiP. PROBS. 85, 85 n.1, 87-93 (1973); Note, Superbowl
and the Sherman Act, 81 HARV. L. REv. 418, 418 n.5, 420-26 (1967).
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calling for the abandonment of the per se approach.1 69 This is
the proper direction in which advancement is needed.
The lower courts should recognize the importance of cost
efficiency and attempt to implement Justice O'Connor's call for
the abandonment of the per se approach. This abandonment
would be extremely beneficial in lowering the cost of health care.
Alternative delivery systems such as Health Maintenance
Organizations 7  ("HMOs") and Preferred Provider
Organizations 7' ("PPOs") can reduce health care costs greatly,
but their potential is extremely limited by the present antitrust
laws.' 72
466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
As a result of rising health care costs, Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMOs") have become widely accepted. HMOs provide unlimited health care for
covered services to the enrollee for a set fee during the term of contract. The HMO, in
turn, contracts with physicians to deliver this comprehensive health care service for a
fixed fee, in contrast to a fee-for-sen ice basis. The prospective patient's choice of
physicians is limited, however, to those physicians who are members of the HMO's
network. By contracting with a limited number of physicians for reduced fees, the HMO
is able to substantially lower the cost of providing health care. See generally 42 U.S.C.
§ 300e (1982); Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Cus-
toinary Practice, 1975 DutKE L.J. 1375, 1375-78; LUFr, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGA-
NIZATIONS: DWIENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE, 5-6, 17 (1981).
"I Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs") provide an alternative for those
individuals who desire the lower costs of HMOs but are dissatisfied by their restricted
choice of physicians. PPOs contract with third party payors such as employers and
insurance companies to provide health care. Hospitals and physicians that participate in
a PPO agree to deliver specific health care services at fixed reduced fees in return for
becoming preferred providers. PPOs benefit both the physician and patient as the
physician receives a fee for senice payment and the individual's choice of physician is
not limited. See generally Preferred Provider Organizations (J. Waxman ed. 1984).
Another alternative system closely related to HMOs is an Individual Practice
As sociation ("IPA"). An IPA also contracts with individual physicians to deliver services
in accordance with the IPA-HMO contract. The physician is paid on a fee-for-service
basis and the prospective patient has the choice of physician. IPAs are a novel idea,
however, in that the physician bears part of the risk of overutilization of the IPA but
also participates in any savings from underutilization. See generally Lut, HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DBtENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE, 5-6, 17 (1981).
' PPOs have been closely scrutinized for potential antitrust violations. The United
States Supreme Court established guidelines for PPOs in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). In Maricopa, a group of physicians collectively
developed a relative value scale and a maximum fee schedule for services to subscribers.
The Supreme Court held this pricing mechanism per se illegal. Id. at 356-57. Further-
more, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has issued a number of letter rulings
further limiting the actions of PPOs. See, e.g., FTC Letter of March 17, 1986; Health
Care Management Assoc. Advisory Opinion, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,036 (1983).
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Although the Jefferson Parish decision is praiseworthy, the
risk exists that the rights of some physicians and members of
the allied health professions will be subordinated in the name of
economic efficiency. Jefferson Parish has been cited in numerous
opinions for denying members of allied health professions prac-
tice privileges at hospitals. 7 3 One of these, Kaczanowski v. Med-
ical Center of Vermont, 74 involved a group of licensed podiatrists
who alleged that the hospital had violated federal antitrust laws
by denying them staff privileges.'" The court concluded, how-
ever, that the hospital's denial was not an illegal restraint of
trade. 176 The Court declared that there was insufficient factual
evidence to provide a legal justification for applying the per se
rule to the plaintiffs' claims. 77 Finding no evidence that other
members of the professional staff were furthering their own
interests in denying the podiatrists' applications for staff privi-
leges, the court rejected the podiatrists' claims. 78
The Kaczanowski court's use of Jefferson Parish to justify
its decision is an improper application of the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning. Jefferson Parish should not be used
to justify inter-professional differences in the health care field.
Podiatrists and other allied health professionals, like medical
doctors, 79 still deserve the protection of the antitrust laws. The
antitrust laws afford necessary protection to both the allied
" See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 823 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1060 (1985) (osteopath); Chiropractic Coop. Ass'n of Mich. v. American Medical
Ass'n, 617 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D.C. Mich. 1985) (chiropractors); Machovec v. Counsil
for Nat'l Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 258,
270 (E.D. Va. 1985) (psychologists); Kaczanowski v. Medical Center of Vt., 612 F.
Supp. 688, 693 (D. Vt. 1985) (podiatrists); Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth.,
Inc., 604 F. Supp. 685, 688 (M.D.N.C. 1985) aff'd, 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.) (podiatrists),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 474 (1986).
174 612 F. Supp. 688 (D. Vt. 1985).
171 Id. at 690-91.
176 Id. at 697.
I" Id. at 693.
I78 d. at 695.
"I Podiatrists, chiropractors and other similar health care professionals receive
advanced training in addition to a college education, usually lasting two years. Although
these individuals are addressed as "doctor" they are not medical doctors. They are,
however, usually licensed by the state in which they practice. See infra note 180 and
accompanying text.
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health professionals and those consumers that can benefit from
their services.
As with most other professionals, allied health professionals
are licensed by the states and must meet a minimum level of
coiiipetency.130 As competition in the health care field increases,
health care providers will attempt to ensure their own financial
well being. Each group should be subjected to competition from
other types of health care providers. Increased competition will
only lower the cost of health care in the United States and
benefit consumers.
Arguably, there is potential for some health care profession-
als to deliver services for which they are unqualified. Numerous
individuals who are not familiar with the differences among
medical doctors, podiatrists, chiropractors, and others could
potentially be the victims of the unauthorized practice of medi-
cine. Although this possibility exists, it does not justify stifling
inter-professional competition. All states have laws both requir-
ing the licensing of health professionals and forbidding the un-
authorized practice of medicine.'3 ' The probability of
unauthorized treatment remains quite remote. The risk of the
unauthorized practice of medicine is small in light of the large
economic benefits to be derived from increased competition
among all health professionals.
The impact of Jefferson Parish and its progeny will be felt
not only among the allied health professions but also among
those physicians who are excluded from practicing at various
hospitals. Their rights should not be ignored totally. As the
number of physicians continues to increase, it is only natural
that competition among physicians will increase and salaries will
fall.1 82 The antitrust laws were created to increase competition;
"I See, e.g., MD. HEALTH Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 2 (audiologists), 3 (chiropractors),
4.5 (dieticians), 5 (electrologists), 7 (nurses), 9 (occupational therapists), 13 (physical
therapists), 15 (podiatrists), 16 (psychologists) and 19 (speech pathologists) (1986).
1 Id.
"I The number of medical degrees that have been granted continues to increase. In
1950, 5,612 medical degrees were conferred, 7,032 in 1960, 7,304 in 1965, 8,314 in 1970,
12,447 in 1975, 14,902 in 1980, 15,814 in 1982, and 15,484 in 1983. Statistical Abstract
of the United States 160 (1986). In certain geographical areas of the United States there
is already an over-abundance of physicians.
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theoretically benefiting the consumer and the economy through
the efficient delivery of health care services. Without the protec-
tion afforded by the Sherman Act 3' and the Clayton Act, 1 4 the
risk exists that the rights of some physicians will be slighted in
order to achieve cost efficient health care.
In Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court noted the rule ap-
plied to the alleged antitrust violations in Times-Picayune,5
International Salt,3 6 and Northern Pacific,17 but failed to ad-
dress the dissimilarities. In International Salt the Court was
concerned with patented machineryss and in Northern Pacific
the Court addressed shipping goods on railroads.3 9 In Jefferson
Parish, however, the Court was confronted with an individual's
right to work. These differences reflect upon the Jefferson Parish
Court's application of International Salt and Northern Pacific.
International Salt and Northern Pacific taken together provide
the foundation of the Jefferson Parish Court's decision to allow
exclusive contracts between physician groups ,and health care
providers. The misinterpretation of these prior cases, however,
potentially exposes the Court's decision to criticism as being
founded on faulty reasoning.
Although the influence of Jefferson Parish on the interpre-
tation of the antitrust laws is uncertain, several conclusions may
be surmised. Of primary importance, black letter law appears to
have been created regarding exclusive contracts and closed staff-
ing as it relates to hospitals.1 90 First, to successfully challenge an
"1 15 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1986).
1'1 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1986).
'* Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1952).
18 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
18 Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
332 U.S. at 393-95.
356 U.S. at 7.
1"0 See, e.g., 745 F.2d at 792 (hospital's policy regarding grant of staff privileges
to osteopaths held illegal restraint of trade); Konik v. Champlain Valley Physician's
Hosp. Medical Center, 733 F.2d 1007, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884
(contract required for employment held not unlawful boycott or monopolization of
market); Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1262, 1268-69 (N.D.
Ind. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1986) (exclusive services contract between
physician and hospital held not per se illegal); Rockland Physician Assoc. v. Grodin,
616 F. Supp. 945, 955 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (hospital's exclusive services contract with one
[Vol. 75
1986-871 JEFFERSON PARISH
exclusive agreement, a physician must demonstrate not only that
he or she was excluded from practicing at a particular hospital
because of an exclusive dealing contract but also that the con-
tract had an adverse effect on competition. Second, to invoke
the use of the per se rule, the plaintiff must prove that the
hospital possessed market power and that it forced unwanted
medical services on the consumer. Without the benefit of a
presumption of illegality, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
contract unreasonably restrains competition in the relevant mar-
ket under a "rule of reason" analysis. This difficult burden
requires a study of the competition among the physicians in the
appropriate geographic market. Furthermore, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the anti-competitive elements of a restrictive
staffing agreement are not outweighed by the delivery of cost-
efficient health care and other pro-competitive effects. This bur-
den is extreme and makes a successful challenge to such a
physician-hospital contract unlikely.'
9'
anesthesiologist not per se illegal); 612 F. Supp. at 692-94 (hospital's denial of staff
privileges to podiatrist held not illegal restraint of trade); Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric
Assoc. v. Onslow County Hosp., 607 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D.C.N.C. 1985); 604 F. Supp.
at 688 (refused to allow podiatrist staff privileges held not illegal group boycott);
McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp. 899, 912-13 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (exclusive
staffing agreement held not illegal group boycott or illegal exclusive dealing contract);
Mays v. Hosp. Auth. of Henry County, 596 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (exclusive
staffing agreement held not illegal group boycott or illegal exclusive dealing contract).
Cf. 617 F. Supp. at 264 (policy of physicians and medical associations toward chiro-
practors held not illegal group boycott); 616 F. Supp. at 270-71; 612 F. Supp. at 692-
94 (failure to list psychologist in register of qualified psychologists held not illegal
boycott).
- See generally, 733 F.2d at 1017-18 (contract required for employment held not
unlawful boycott or monopolization of market); Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosp., Inc.,
703 F.2d 942, 952-54 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting challenge to exclusive staffing arrangement
for. emergency rooms); Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684
F.2d 1346, 1352-54 (7th Cir. 1982) (adopting the reasoning of the district court in
Jefferson Parish and rejecting argument that exclusive medical contracts amount to
boycott or other per se violation); Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 438, 439 (4th Cir. 1980)
(exclusive arrangement found reasonable and challenge also falls to show effect on
interstate commerce}; Harron v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 522 F.2d 1133, 1134 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976) (antitrust challenge to exclusive medical
contract held so "frivolous" that suit must be dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction);
621 F. Supp. at 1268-69 (exclusive services contract between physician and hospital held
not per se illegal); 616 F. Supp. at 270-72 (failure to list psychologists in register of
qualified psychologists was not an illegal boycott); 612 F. Supp. at 692-96 (hospitals'
denial of staff privileges to podiatrists was not an illegal restraint of trade); 604 F.
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CONCLUSION
In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 192 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a contract between a
physician group and a hospital to exclusively provide essential
medical services will not violate federal antitrust laws. This
decision acknowledges the goals of the federal antitrust policy,
while recognizing the health care industry's need to formulate
new means of providing cost-efficient health care. While Jeffer-
son Parish is the Supreme Court's first meaningful guideline to
physician-hospital contracts in the antitrust area, it raises uncer-
tainties as to the future of the per se doctrine. This uncertainty
most likely will result in a larger degree of responsiveness in the
judiciary that will be a positive input in the health care field.
The consequence of this responsiveness logically should lead to
more cost-efficient health care in the future.
Supp. at 688 (refusal to allow podiatrists staff privileges held not illegal group boycott;
rejecting other antitrust claims); 597 F. Supp. at 912-16 (exclusive staffing agreement
not illegal group boycott or illegal exclusive dealing contract); 596 F. Supp. at 121-22
(exclusive contract with hospital held to not constitute unreasonable restraint of trade);
Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d
824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982) (by using a closed staff, hospital has
built "high quality staff" and "improved its ability to compete"; rejecting a large
number of different antitrust claims).
1- 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
193 Id. at 2.
